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Introduction
Recently, tort law commentators have discovered truth in Justice Holmes'
maxim that "hard cases make bad law."' In particular, commentators have
criticized cases in which courts have relaxed the traditional rule of causation,
permitting plaintiffs to recover damages without connecting their harm to a
specific defendant.' A notable example has arisen in the context of litigation
involving Factor VIII concentrate, a pharmaceutical product used by
hemophiliacs to replace the clotting protein missing in their blood.3
Pharmaceutical companies have manufactured Factor VI concentrate
since the 1970s, processing the pooled blood plasma of thousands of
individuals. 4 Initially, Factor VIII concentrate improved many hemophiliacs'
quality of life.5 In the early 1980s, however, portions of the nation's blood
supply, including plasma collected to process Factor VIII concentrate, became
1. See Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to the
Problem of Causation, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 197 (1992); Laura A. Abrams, Comment, The DES
Dilemma: A Study in How Hard Cases Make Bad Law, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 489 (1990); see also
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Fnpry
Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 310 (1990). In a dissenting opinion in Northern
Sec. Co. v. United States, Justice Holmes wrote:
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not
by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts
the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which
makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled
principles of law will bend.
193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. See supra note 1 and articles cited therein; see also Andrew R. Klein, Beyond DES: Rejecting
the Application of Market Share Liability in Blood Products Litigation, 68 TuL. L. REV. 883 (1994)
(discussing litigation involving Factor VIII concentrate); David M. Schultz, Market Share Liability in
DES Cases: The Unwarranted Erosion of Causation in Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 771 (1991) (discussing
DES litigation); Nancy Lee Firak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of Cause-In-Fact: Alternative
Forms of Liability, Epidemiological Proof and Trans-Scientific Issues, 63 TEMP. L.Q. 311 (1990)
(discussing use of statistical probabilities to prove actual causation).
3. Doe v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 698 F. Supp. 780 (D. Minn. 1988); McKee v. Miles Labs., Inc.,
675 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Ky. 1987), aft'd, 866 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989). For a general discussion of
the nature of Factor VIII concentrate and the plight of hemophiliacs, see Ron J. Perey, Hemophiliacs,
Transfilons, and AIDS, 14 TRIAL DtPL. J. 137, 137-46 (1991).
4. Klein, supra note 2, at 907 & nn. 126-28 (citing Perey, supra note 3, and various cases); see
also Linda Bean, No Class Action in Hemophilia-AIDS Suits, N.J. L.J., May 2, 1994, at 8 (concentrate
is "produced by a process that uses the blood plasma of 20,000 to 150,000 donors per batch"); Peter
Finn, Hemophiliacs with AIDS Cry Murder; Firms Blamed for HIV Infection, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 9,
1994, at 4 ("Each dose [of factor concentrate] is drawn from the pooled blood plasma of up to 20,000
people.").
5. Hemophilia treatments prior to the advent of concentrates involved whole blood transfusions,
which carried a serious risk of vascular overload, or slow in-hospital infusions with "cryoprecipitate,"
a frozen portion of plasma rich in the Factor VIII protein. See Percy, supra note 3, at 141. Concentrates,
however, permit hemophiliacs to quickly reconstitute the product with water and treat themselves at
home. Concentrates thus "freed many [hemophiliacs] from the emergency room and lifelong struggles
with pain and disability." Elizabeth Kastor, Blood Feud: Hemophiliacs and AIDS, WASH. POST, May
10, 1993, at I, B6.
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tainted with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the virus that causes
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).6 As a result, many
hemophiliacs became infected with the deadly virus.7
During the past decade, HIV-infected hemophiliacs have filed an
increasing number of lawsuits against Factor VIII concentrate manufacturers. 8
Many such litigants, however, face an insurmountable hurdle to recovery
because they cannot identify the manufacturer of the concentrate that caused
their infection.9 In response to this problem, one state supreme court 0 and
one federal district court" have permitted hemophiliac plaintiffs to proceed
on a "market share liability" theory, effectively eliminating the need for these
plaintiffs to prove actual causation.' 2 As this author has argued, however, the
extension of market share liability to blood products litigation makes little
sense. The extension threatens the availability of blood products for many
hemophiliacs. It also runs counter to every state's prohibition against the
6. See Finn, supra note 4 (reporting that by the early 1980s, 90% of the nation's Factor VIII
concentrate supply was contaminated with HIV); Bean, supra note 4, at 8 ("One donor with AIDS can
contaminate an entire lot and infect every patient who takes the medication."); Klein, supra note 2, at
908.
7. See Finn, supra note 4 (reporting that by January 1994, 2,000 hemophiliacs in the United States
had died of AIDS; 9,000 were infected with HIV); Mireya Navarro, Hemophiliacs Demand Answers
as AIDS Toll Rises, N.Y. TIMEs, May 10, 1993, at Al (reporting that by 1985, 70% of the nation's
hemophiliacs had become infected with HIV through the use of clotting factors); Linda A. Johnson,
Lawsuit: Drug Companies Negligent of AIDS Risks; Infections Could Have Been Prevented, Suit Says,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, April 12, 1994, at 3 (reporting that an estimated 12,000 American hemophiliacs
suffer from HIV infection or AIDS); Brad Evenson, Lack of Compensation One More Blow to a Very
Sick Man, OTTAWA CrIZEN, March 26, 1994, at BI (reporting that approximately 45% of Canadian
hemophiliacs are infected with HIV caused by "tainted blood").
8. See Finn, supra note 4 (discussing factor concentrate litigation and reporting class action
lawsuit filed in Chicago on September 30, 1993); Johnson, supra note 7, at 3 (same); cf. Bean, supra
note 4, at 8 (reporting that a Pennsylvania state court judge refused to certify class action lawsuit in
factor concentrate case). Plaintiffs in factor concentrate lawsuits often assert that manufacturers acted
negligently in processing the concentrate by failing to adequately warn doctors and hemophiliacs of
known risks associated with concentrate and by collecting plasma from individuals at high risk for HIV
infection. See Klein, supra note 2, at 908 (citing Jones v. Miles Labs., Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1127, 1128-29
(N.D. Ga. 1988), aft'd, 887 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1989); McKee v. Miles Labs., Inc., 675 F. Supp.
1060, 1061-64 (E.D. Ky. 1987), aff'd, 866 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989)); see also Finn, supra note 4;
Johnson, supra note 7, at 3.
9. Under traditional tort theory, these plaintiffs cannot maintain a cause of action because they
cannot prove cause in fact. To prove cause in fact, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his injury would
not have occurred but for a specific defendant's act or omission. W. PAGE KEETON, Er AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 265 (5th ed. 1984). For a thorough examination of the
cause in fact element in tort law, see Paul J. Zwier, "Cause in Fact" in Tort Law - A Philosophical
and Historical Examination, 31 DEPAUL L. REv. 769 (1982).
10. Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991).
11. Ray v. Cutter Lab., 754 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
12. Market share liability permits a plaintiff in a products liability action to recover damages
against a group of defendants based on the amount of product each defendant sold in a geographic area,
regardless of whether the plaintiff can connect her harm to a specific defendant's product. The theory
was developed in cases involving the prescription drug diethylstilbestrol (DES). See infra note 16 and
cases cited therein.
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application of strict liability in blood litigation.' 3 Two federal district courts
recently have concurred, rejecting the application of market share liability in
blood products cases. 4
Rejecting market share liability in blood products litigation, however,
raises a troubling quandary. Innocent individuals are infected with a deadly
virus and need immediate assistance. But, absent the tort system, no
mechanism for compensation exists. In response to similar dilemmas,
commentators and judges often have asserted that the legislative branch of
government should provide relief.' Legislation proponents, however, have
been less than successful in actually formulating workable alternatives to the
tort system.' 6
13. At the heart of this argument is the fact that Factor VIII concentrate, unlike DES, does not
present a uniform risk of harm to users. All DES was chemically equivalent. Thus, the risk to every
DES user was identical. Factor VIII concentrate, on the other hand, is not chemically equivalent. Rather,
Factor VIII concentrate is only dangerous if it is infected with virus. Unlike DES, therefore, some
concentrate presented no risk at all to users. The odds that a particular lot of concentrate was infected
depended on a number of factors, including where source plasma was collected and how carefully donors
were screened. See Klein, supra note 2, at 912-28; infra notes 14-15.
14. Doe v. Cutter Biological, 1994 WL 184830 (D. Idaho May 12, 1994); Kellar v. Cutter Labs.,
No. 88-14059-CIV-RYSKAMP, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 1992). Judge Ryskamp explained:
The characteristics of the Factor VIII concentrate industry ... make it an
inappropriate one for the application of market share liability .... The collection of Factor
VIII from pools of donors, the fact that each manufacturer retains its own manufacturing
process, should make Factor VIII manufacturers liable to degrees that vary from their
market share .... [Further,] Factor VIII, unlike asbestos or DES, is not inherently
dangerous. While every exposure to either DES or asbestos is harmful, this is not
necessarily the case with Factor VIII. The policy behind the market share liability principle
that the manufacturer contributed to the risk of harm is therefore absent.
id. at 9-10.
15. See Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 736 (Haw. 1991) (Moon, J., concurring
in pan and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the majority's application of "market share liability"
to a blood products case because "[tlhere are too many unanswered questions of social, economic, and
legal import which only the legislature, with its investigative powers and procedures, can determine");
Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986) ("[Alwarding damages... by means
of a court-constructed device that places liability on manufacturers who were not proved to have caused
the injury involves social engineering more appropriately within the legislative domain. "); Roger S. Fine,
A Personal Perspective from the "Manufacturer", 55 BROOK. L. REv. 899, 903 (1989) ("[L]et us go
back to the days when there was a real difference between the judicial and legislative branches. When
a court is faced with a problem that is a social one rather than a legal one, we defer to the legislature,
which has far more flexibility and power to mold solutions that match our problems."); Stephen A. Spitz,
From Res Ipsa Loquitur to Diethylstllbestrol: The Unidentifiable Tortfeasor in Calfornla, 65 IND. L.J.
591, 634 (1990) ("A readily apparent issue concerns the role of courts in addressing the existing
harm .... [Miany situations are better left in the legislative domain and/or are best addressed by
providing administrative remedies.").
16. Several notable attempts include the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42
U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to -34 (1988) [hereinafter NCVIA], the National Swine Flu Immunization Program
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 24Th, and the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945.
See generally ENTERPRISE LIABILTY FOR PERSONAL INJuRY 441-86 (A.L.I. Reporters' Study 1991).
Tellingly, Congress enacted these statutory schemes before the development of any new expansive tort
theory in their respective subject areas. As Professor Sugarman has noted, judicial expansion of an
existing tort law structure can make tort law harder to supplant: "As the system grows, the stakes
increase, and these interests find more reasons to fight the displacement of tort. At the same time
liberalizing tort law takes time, talent, and attention away from work on superior compensation plans."
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This Article proposes an administrative scheme to compensate
hemophiliacs infected with HIV through the use of blood products. The
proposal is narrowly focused-it suggests replacing tort law only for
hemophiliacs who would otherwise rely on expansive tort theories, such as
market share liability, due to their inability to prove causation. 1" At the same
time, the proposal encourages claimants who can identify a culpable defendant
to remain in the tort system, allowing the threat of litigation to deter negligent
conduct.' 8 Finally, the proposal is faithful to legislative determinations that
prohibit the application of strict liability to blood processors. 9
More broadly, the Article challenges those who assert that discrete
proposals to replace small areas of the tort system are unwise, and that only
proposals for wholesale revisions of the tort system merit serious
consideration.2" In response, the Article provides an example of a narrow,
but workable, scheme that actually can compensate a group of injured
individuals, while also providing a structural model for future tort law
alternatives.
Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. Rav. 555, 592 (1985).
Litigation involving DES appears to prove Professor Sugarman's point. In these cases, many
women developed a specific form of cancer attributable to DES taken by their mothers years earlier.
Most of these young women, however, could not prove causation because they could not identify the
company that manufactured the DES taken by their mothers. In several states, courts adopted a new tort
theory known as market share liability, allowing DES plaintiffs to proceed without proving actual
causation. See Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1990); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368
(Wash. 1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, (Wis.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984);
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
Despite the new theory, several commentators advocated the enactment of an administrative
compensation scheme as a superior method to compensate women injured by DES. See 0. Lee Reed
& John L. Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case for Federal Action, 63 NEB. L. REV. 389,
461-71 (1984); Schultz, supra note 2; Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, Failure to Identify the
Defendant in Tort Law: Towards aLegislative Solution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 941-75 (1985); Cynthia
L. Chase, Note, Market Share Liability: A Plea for Legislative Alternatives, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 1003,
1003-43 (1982); Andrew B. Nace, Note, Market Share Liability: A Current Assessment of a Decade-Old
Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395, 436-38 (1991). However, perhaps due to the "stakes" and "interests"
identified by Professor Sugarman, neither Congress nor any state legislature enacted a compensation
scheme for DES victims.
17. See infra Part H.
18. See infra notes 30-31, 64, 77-86 and accompanying text.
19. The Article proposes achieving this goal through a financing mechanism that requires
concentrate manufacturers to fund compensation only for individuals infected with HIV after the scientific
community concluded that the virus was blood transmissible. In this way, the scheme roughly equates
liability with industry culpability. In short, the goals of the compensation scheme proposed herein are:
(1) the provision of a reliable source of compensation for innocent HIV-infected hemophiliacs; (2) the
retention of potential tort liability to deter negligent conduct where a hemophiliac can prove that his
infection is the result of a particular blood processor's conduct; and (3) the formulation of a scheme that
is consistent with state prohibitions against the application of strict liability in blood litigation.
20. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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II. Jurisdiction
A. Defining the Boundaries
As Professor Robert L. Rabin has written, "[tihe starting point in any
discussion of the components of an administrative compensation scheme is the
boundaries question-the determination of which claims fall within the system
and which remain under the domain of tort."21 This Article suggests a narrow
boundaries definition: A blood products scheme should compensate claimants
infected with HIV through the use of factor concentrate only where the
claimant cannot identify the manufacturer of the concentrate that caused his
harm. By limiting access in this manner, the scheme will compensate HIV-
infected hemophiliacs who are unable to prove causation in a tort case, thereby
removing from the tort system those cases that tempt courts to rely on
expansive theories such as market share liability.
B. Defending the Narrow Focus
Some commentators strongly criticize proposed compensation schemes
with narrow boundary definitions. These critics contend that such proposals
are myopic, solving the tort system's narrow problems while ignoring or
exacerbating its broader deficiencies.' The hemophilia/AIDS dilemma,
however, presents a situation in which a narrowly-tailored scheme makes
perfect sense. As detailed below, a narrowly-focused blood products scheme
21. Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative
Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REv. 951, 964 (1993).
22. Most hemophiliacs use a product called Factor VIII concentrate, which replaces the Factor
VIII clotting protein in their blood. A smaller number use a similar product called Factor IX concentrate.
Perey, supra note 3, at 138; Sheryl Stolberg, CruelLink: Hemophilia andAIDS, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 31,
1994, at Al; see also Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Factor IX products
are generally produced to treat hemophiliacs with hemophilia-B, a hereditary blood clotting disorder
characterized by Factor IX deficiency, but may also be used to treat rare non-hemophilia bleeding
disorders."). This Article will use the terms "factor concentrate," "concentrate," or simply "blood
products" in reference to either product.
23. For example, Professor Sugarman has written:
[Pleople notice that tort law is not doing an adequate job on a particular issue which
concerns them. They then seek various reforms without attempting to solve interrelated
problems about which they may know and care little. The result, however, can be an
overall pattern that looks like a crazy quilt. One steps back and asks, 'why these victims
and not others?"
Sugarman, supra note 16, at 626.
Similarly, Professor Pierce has written that various incremental changes are often inconsistent
conceptually and functionally, and most are too limited in scope to offer any real promise for improving
the allocation of safety-related resources .... Since the problems are global and are deeply embedded
in the basic rules of the present legal system, the narrow scope of most studies limits their value as a
basis for constructive change. Richard J. Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and




presents a realistic opportunity to help many victims of HIV-tainted blood
products. Additionally, such a scheme would limit forces that have
dramatically increased the costs of non-tainted products for non-infected
individuals. Finally, a narrowly-tailored scheme (in conjunction with the tort
system) would allow tort law's deterrent effect to operate efficiently.
First, a narrowly-focused blood products scheme presents a realistic
opportunity to help many victims of HIV-tainted blood products. Few people
expect that Congress will soon enact legislation to replace broad components
of the common law tort system.' Thus, large-scale reform proposals provide
little promise of assistance to injured individuals who find scant relief in the
current tort system. On the other hand, narrowly-tailored proposals have
enjoyed at least limited legislative and social success.' These successes
should be viewed, not as a "crazy quilt" of special interest concessions,' but
as models of how to help individuals who face obstacles to obtaining
compensation in tort.
Second, enactment of a narrowly-focused compensation scheme in the
blood products area would alleviate a horribly ironic dilemma: that the
litigation efforts of HIV-infected hemophiliacs have increased the economic
24. While this generalization does not prove the superiority of "small scale" schemes, it certainly
helps justify serious consideration of such schemes, especially where potential claimants have nowhere
else to turn. In similar contexts, others agree. For example, in discussing proposals for enterprise liability
(including proposals involving administrative compensation schemes), Professors Kenneth Abraham,
Robert Rabin, and Paul Weiler have written:
[W]e are aware of intriguing speculations about whether the nation would be better off
dispensing with tort litigation entirely, leaving the injury field to these alternative regimes.
Perhaps because of our more pragmatic bent-taking the world as it is, not as some of us
might dream it should be-we did not propose such a political nonstarter. Our Study
accepts the continuing reality and value of tort law-a system of civil liability, primarily
shaped by judges and juries, enforced by victims themselves against enterprises responsible
for their injury-as an instrument that should, and will, remain available for other kinds
of injury problems not adequately dealt with in either the private marketplace or the political
and regulatory arenas.
Kenneth S. Abraham et al., Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Further Reflections, 30 SAN
DMEo L. Rv. 333, 360 (1993). See also Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort
Reform, 25 SAN DiEo L. Rav. 13 (1988) (arguing that successful enactment of broad-based no-fault
schemes has been dependent on a political environment in which sweeping social reform movements
were proposed).
25. One example is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA), see supra note 16,
enacted in 1986 to compensate children who suffer injurious side effects caused by childhood
vaccinations. Commentators have generally praised the NCVIA for stabilizing vaccine prices and
alleviating fears of vaccine shortages. See Kellen F. Cloney, Comment, AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers
v. Tort Regime: The Need for Alternatives, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 559, 596 (1992); H. William
Smith MI, Note, Vaccinating AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers Against Product Liability, 42 CAE W. Ras.
L. REv. 207, 228 (1992). Some individuals, however, have questioned the effectiveness of the NCVIA.
See Warren E. Leary, Panel Discounts Many Adverse Effects 7led to Chuldhood Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 1991, at A10, cited in Rabin, supra note 21, at 960 n.53; Laura Mazzuca, Shot Through with
Problems: A Partial Success, Vaccine Injury Fund Faces Case Logjam, Funding Shortfalls, Bus. INS.,
Aug. 24, 1992, at 1. Other examples of "narrow scope" compensation schemes include the National
Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 and the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972. See supra note 16.
26. See Sugarman, supra note 16, at 626.
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burdens on hemophiliacs who are not infected with HIV. As the New York
Times recently reported: "For many hemophiliacs infected with HIV, money
has become a primary issue. [But] those who have not yet had symptoms of
illness are struggling with another legacy of HIV-skyrocketing prices for
factor that is now purified."27 Actual and threatened broad-based litigation
contribute to these skyrocketing prices, and these dramatic price increases have
made factor concentrate effectively unavailable to many hemophiliacs who rely
on the product for survival. 8 A narrowly-focused compensation scheme
would curb this trend by removing from the tort arena the most strongly
contested and expensive type of blood products lawsuits-those in which
causation is unclear. 29
Finally, a narrowly-focused blood products scheme would allow a scaled-
down litigation threat to operate as a more efficient deterrent to negligent
conduct by concentrate manufacturers. By including only individuals who
cannot prove causation, the scheme separates the wheat from the
chaff-removing from the tort system claims that the system cannot handle
well, while leaving in the tort system claims that the system can handle fairly
and efficiently.3" As a result, a blood products manufacturer would still need
27. Navarro, supra note 7, at B2. At first glance, the emergence of highly-purified factor
concentrate, processed through the most sophisticated and expensive viral inactivation techniques, appears
to be an indisputably positive occurrence for blood product users. See, e.g., Stolberg, supra note 22,
at Al8. Critics, however, castigate manufacturers for creating concentrate shortages by focusing
production efforts on the "safest" concentrate and ceasing production of "intermediate grade" (and less
expensive) concentrate. See Jeff Lyon, A Matter of Life & Death, C. TRm., April 23, 1989, §10
(Magazine), at 17. But given current litigation threats and scientific uncertainty regarding the effects
of HIV exposure on even HIV-positive hemophiliacs, economics and common sense dictate no other
course. See Klein, supra note 2, at 920-21 & nn.191-92.
28. See Lyon, supra note 27, at 12 ("The average adult hemophiliac who in 1987 paid $10,000
a year for treatment is suddenly facing annual drug bills ranging from $60,000 to $100,000 a year.");
Navarro, supra note 7, at B2 (reporting that one dose of purified clotting factor can cost more than
$1000, leading to annual costs of $50,000 to $100,000 for some hemophiliacs); see also Diane Hirth,
Legislators Reluctant to Cover Expensive Health Measures, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 2, 1994, at Cl
(citing example of hemophiliac whose clotting factor costs are $40,000 a year and suggesting that costs
are higher for others); Johnson, supra note 7, at 3 (describing hemophilia as "the most financially
catastrophic illness because of the exorbitant cost for clotting factor"). Litigation costs also may lead
to product shortages for hemophiliacs who need factor concentrate. See Klein, supra note 2, at 919-21;
see also Lyon, supra note 27 (quoting blood products industry spokesmen who attribute increased factor
concentrate costs, in part, to the costs of products liability litigation).
29. The risks associated with this continued rise in product cost increase as the nation grapples
with issues of health and insurance reform. For example, when the Florida legislature recently considered
a proposed basic health care benefits package, it excluded coverage for blood products. A spokesman
for the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration was quoted as stating: "We'd love to have
everything in there, but the cost would be excessive .... You've got to make choices. Doing this thing
was rough." Hirth, supra note 28, at CI.
30. Professor Sugarman recently insinuated as much by suggesting that "small injury cases" be
among the first removed from the tort system. Stephen D. Sugarman, Proposals For Reform, 15 U.
HAw. L. Rav. 659, 664-65 (1993). Although Professor Sugarman focused on "small injury cases," the
size of cases is only relevant because of the tort system's inability to efficiently handle that category of
claims. Id. The same argument can be made regarding cases of indeterminate cause.
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to anticipate tort liability for its own conduct; a manufacturer would not,
however, need to fear tort liability based on the conduct of others.31
In short, a narrowly-focused compensation scheme makes good sense in
the blood products realm, particularly where victims of HIV-tainted blood
products cannot prove that the conduct of any particular concentrate
manufacturer caused their harm. A narrowly-focused scheme presents a
realistic opportunity for helping victims of HIV-tainted blood products; it limits
forces contributing to the skyrocketing prices of non-tainted products; and it
permits tort law's deterrent effect to operate more efficiently.
II. Financing
Once a compensation scheme establishes boundaries, it must address the
issue of financing. Understandably, most schemes seek significant financing
from entities that engage in activities that harm claimants.32 Compelling blood
products manufacturers to fund a compensation scheme, however, raises a
unique problem: Every state prohibits the imposition of liability on blood
processing entities for injuries caused by blood products absent proof of
negligent conduct.33 If a compensation scheme compels financial participation
from blood processors without regard to fault, the scheme risks becoming a
de facto no fault system at odds with each state's express policy
determination.'
To solve this problem, this section of the Article proposes a financing
mechanism that links industry funding and industry fault. The section first
31. Such a fear exists in jurisdictions that apply market share liability. This leads to a problem
that some commentators describe as "overdeterrence." See Klein, supra note 2, at 927 n.218 (citing
Keith C. Miller & John D. Hancock, Perspectives on Market Share Liability: Thme for a Reassessment,
88 W. VA. L. REv. 81, 103 (1985)). Economists, however, would still fault the system proposed herein
unless the compensation scheme required each manufacturer to contribute a sum so that "an injurer's
liability to the system . . . equal[s] the total cost of the risk the injurer imposes on the affected
population." Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REv. 1093,
1100 (1993). While this proposal might not completely satisfy an economist in this regard, the proposal
would undoubtedly improve the current situation, consisting of a litigation patchwork that includes the
possibility of market share liability. See, e.g., infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text (discussing
compensation for nonpecuniary losses as a means of accounting for efficiency concerns).
32. Professor Rabin notes that "[t]ypically, a no-fault scheme is financed through charges
imposed on those parties engaged in the injury-producing activity." Rabin, supra note 21, at 976. He
points to several existing and proposed compensation schemes as examples. For instance, the NCVIA
imposes an excise tax on each dose of childhood vaccine dispersed, id. at 958; the Superfund proposal
would impose a tax on the production of toxic chemicals, crude oil, and the disposal of hazardous waste,
id. at 961; and the Chemical Injury Liability Act (referred to by Professor Rabin as the ELI proposal)
would impose a tax on chemical and petroleum production, id.
33. See infra note 36.
34. While Congress may well have the power to enact such a system, respect for such a unanimity
of policy determinations dictates special concern and at least a serious effort at finding a funding solution
that is consistent with these judgments. See infra note 127; see also infra Part II.A (discussing blood
shield statutes and the policy behind their enactment).
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discusses the need for a fault-contribution equivalency by briefly reviewing
state laws that protect blood processors from no-fault liability. The section then
suggests the establishment of a "presumed negligent" date, after which the
scheme (for financing purposes) will assume that HIV transmission through
blood products resulted from industry negligence. With the "presumed
negligent" date established, the section next proposes a system of industry
taxation pegged to concentrate sales and the likely date on which each claimant
became infected with HIV.35 Finally, the section asserts that the proposed
financing scheme would promote fairness and efficiency, especially when
compared to the current state of blood products tort law.
A. Blood Shield Laws
By either legislative enactment or judicial decision, all fifty states and the
District of Columbia preclude the application of no-fault liability in blood or
blood products tort litigation.36 The proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts:
35. Using these mechanisms, industry taxes would fund compensation for claimants infected after
the presumed negligent date. General congressional appropriations would fund compensation for
claimants infected before the presumed negligent date. The industry, therefore, would provide funding
only for the compensation of injuries that occurred after the earliest time at which the industry could
be considered negligent for failing to warn of the risk of HIV transmission through the use of factor
concentrate. See infra part II.B-C.
36. ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(4) (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.316(e) (1962); AIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32-1481(A)-(B) (1956); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-9-802, 4-2-316(d)(i) (Michie 1987); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1990); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-104(1)-(3) (West
1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-280 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 6-2-316(5) (1974);
FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 672.316(5) (Harrison 1980); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-1-28(a)-(b), 11-2-316(5)
(1982); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 325-91, 327-51 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 39-3702 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 745, para. 40/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 745, para. 40/3 (1988); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-8-7-2(a)-(b) (Bums 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 142A.8 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701
(1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.125 (Baldwin 1991); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. Art. § 2322.1 (West
1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-108 (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-402
(1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.9121(l)-(3) (West 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-1 (1972); Mo. STAT. § 431.069 (Vernon
1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-33-102, 50-33-103, 50-33-104 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-4001
(1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460.010 (Michie 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.8-b (1983);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-5; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 580.4 (McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 130A-410 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2108.11 (Anderson
1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 63-2151 (West 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.300(1)-(2) (1993); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 42-8333 (1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-30 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-10
(Law Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-315.1 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2-
316(5) (West 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-32-102 (1992); TEx. Clv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 77.001-77.004 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-31-1 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-297
(Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (West 1992); W.VA. CODE § 16-23-1 (1991);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146.31(l)-(3) (West 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-5-110 (1994). Minnesota, New
Jersey, and the District of Columbia are the only jurisdictions without blood shield statutes. In each
jurisdiction, however, courts have refused to impose liability on blood distributors. See Kozup v.
Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1058-60 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd in part and vacated in part on
other grounds, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank,
Inc., 132 N.W.2d 805, 810-11 (Minn. 1965); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 317 A.2d 392, 398 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1974), af'd, 322 A.2d 596 (N.J. 1975). For a brief discussion of the development of
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Products Liability incorporates this overwhelming view: "A seller of human
blood products or human tissue is subject to liability for harm to persons
caused by product defects if, at the time of sale, the seller failed to exercise
reasonable care in obtaining, processing or selling the blood product or
tissue. "37
Courts have prohibited the application of no-fault liability to hospitals, 8
blood banks, 9 and blood processors' alike. In such cases, courts have
recognized the need to ensure an affordable, adequate supply of blood and
blood products for those who need them.4"
This limitation on liability (and its underlying premise) is especially
compelling in cases involving blood products users. Normally, courts and
commentators justify the imposition of strict liability as a means of shifting
injury costs to product sellers that can spread the costs among a large
consumer base.42 This justification weakens when applied to blood products
blood shield statutes, see Klein, supra note 2, at 913-15.
37. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (THIRD): PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4B (Prelim. Draft No. 2, May
19, 1994).
38. See Cutler v. Graduate Hosp., 717 F.Supp. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Kozup v. Georgetown
University, 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1058-59 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403
A.2d 1130 (D.C. 1979)), vacated in part on other grounds, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Zichichi
v. Middlesex Memorial Hosp., 528 A.2d 805 (Conn. 1987); Gibson v. Methodist Hosp., 822 S.W.2d
95 (Tex. App. 1991).
39. See Samson v. GreenvilleHosp., 368 S.E.2d 665 (S.C. 1988); Shelby v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Hosp., 1988 WL 28996 (S.D. Tex.); Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 785 P.2d 815
(Wash. 1990).
40. See Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1991); Coffee v. Cutter Biological, 809
F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1987); Doe v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 698 F. Supp. 780 (D. Minn. 1988); Doe v. Cutter
Lab., Inc., 703 F.Supp. 573 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Jones v. Miles Lab., Inc., 705 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ga.
1987), aff'd, 887 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1989); McKee v. Miles Lab., Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D.
Ky. 1987), aff'd, 866 F.2d 219 (6th Cit. 1989); Rogers v. Miles Lab., Inc., 802 P.2d 1346 (Wash.
1991).
41. The Washington Supreme Court's recent statement is especially clear:
First, the societal need to ensure an affordable, adequate blood supply furnishes a persuasive
reason for distinguishing between victims of defective blood and victims of other defective
products. Second, strict liability cannot provide an incentive to promote all possible accident
prevention at a time when there was no possible means of screening the blood for HIV.
Third, although producers may be in a better position to spread the costs, it is not in
society's best interest to have the price of a transfusion reflect its true costs.
Howell, 785 P.2d at 822. For a similar policy statement in the context of a case against a blood
processor, see Doe, 698 F. Supp. at 782 ("Hemophiliacs ... depend on the availability of Factor VIII
Concentrate which has lengthened and improved the quality of their lives. Because the market for these
products is small, their availability would be threatened if the cost of the inherent risk of HIV infection
were imposed on the manufacturer [regardless of fault]. "). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-104(1)
(West 1989) ("It is, therefore, the public policy of this state to promote the health and welfare of the
people by . . . limiting the legal liability arising out of such scientific procedures to instances of
negligence or willful misconduct."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-40 (1981) ("It is, therefore, the public
policy of this state to promote the health and welfare of the people by limiting the legal liability arising
out of such scientific procedures to instances of negligence or willful misconduct."); TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 77.002 (West 1986) ("It is therefore the public policy of this state to promote
the health and welfare of the people by limiting the legal liability arising from those scientific procedures
to instances of negligence.").
42. See, e.g., GuiDo CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-40 (1970).
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manufacturers because the number of hemophiliacs (who would bear the
greatest portion of costs) is extremely small. 3 With a very small consumer
base over which to spread costs, the imposition of strict liability would pose
a serious threat to the availability of factor concentrate due to increased cost
or reduced production-a potentially deadly situation to people who rely on
blood products to survive. As the Washington Supreme Court recently
explained: "It would be unrealistic to expect such a small number of
hemophiliacs to be able efficiently to spread the costs associated with liability
insurance . . . The end result for [factor concentrate] would be that the
product would not be available to those who need it."'
B. Contribution and Fault
Thus, to promote the welfare of all hemophiliacs, a compensation scheme
should avoid imposing a form of strict liability on blood products
manufacturers. Instead, a compensation scheme should attempt to link financial
responsibility with culpability in obtaining industry funding.
To achieve this goal, the level of industry funding should correlate with
the cost of compensating those claimants infected with HIV from concentrate
after April 1984-the time when the scientific community reached a consensus
that HIV was blood transmissible.4 The scheme thereby links culpability'
and responsibility: The blood products industry will compensate only
individuals infected with HIV after the earliest possible time the industry could
be considered negligent for a failure to warn of the HIV risk associated with
factor concentrate. 47 For compensation of claimants infected through the use
43. Klein, supra note 2, at 917 & nn.178-79.
44. Rogers v. Miles Lab., Inc., 802 P.2d 1346, 1351-52 (Wash. 1991). See Klein, supra note
2, at 917 & n.179.
45. See Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 190, 192 (4th Cit. 1991); Kirkendall v. Harbor
Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857, 860 (8th Cir. 1989); McKee v, Miles Lab., Inc., 866 F.2d 219, 224 (6th Cir.
1989); Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (D.D.C. 1987), vacated in part on other
grounds, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Ci. 1988).
46. This is true where the "culpability" is associated with a factor concentrate. The
"culpability" meant here is that associated with a factor concentrate manufacturer's failure to warn
of the risk of HIV transmission or its failure to screen plasma donors adequately for signs that they
might carry HIV. This "culpability" is not based on manufacturers' alleged negligence in failing to
develop processing techniques that inactivate HIV in blood products. This proposal's failure to
account for allegations of manufacturing negligence is purposeful. Considering that aspect of the
problem would require individualized fact finding regarding the actions of each manufacturer at
many possible times. Such fact finding would inevitably be complicated and adversarial, defeating
the scheme's goal of quickly compensating HIV-infected hemophiliacs. Cf. Schwartz & Mahshigian,
supra note 16, at 970-71 (suggesting that industry contribution to legislative fund in DES realm
relate to factors such as share of market and degree of culpability).
47. Some individuals have argued that the industry should have warned factor concentrate users
of the risk of HIV transmission as early as 1982. See Moore v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 1990 WL
369571 at *3 (M.D. Fla.); see also United Blood Serv. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 512 (Colo. 1992)
(citing affidavit of AIDS Clinical Research Center doctor stating that "as of January 1983 there was
ample evidence available to the medical community... that the AIDS virus was transmissible in blood
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of concentrate before April 1984, Congress should provide funding from
general revenue.48
C. Fact Finding
The implementation of a financing allocation based on a likely date of
infection (LDI) would require a fact finder to consider each claimant's history
of blood product use.49 Admittedly, gathering and evaluating such information
would diminish a scheme's ability to handle claims quickly. Several fact
finding methods, however, could minimize administrative delays.
One way that scheme administrators could collect information relevant to
a LDI determination would be to require that claimants provide administrators
with all information necessary to the determination. Under this approach,
claimants would provide scheme administrators with information concerning
their product use history and scientific or medical documentation concerning
conclusions to be drawn from such information," ° Placing full responsibility
on claimants, however, would greatly increase the cost of access to the system.
It also might inhibit the system's ability to develop internal consistency in
handling similarly-situated claimants-particularly if different experts found
varying LDIs based on similar product usage records.5'
and blood products," and that hemophiliacs were among the highest risk groups for AIDS). Courts,
however, have rejected such arguments. See Doe, 927 F.2d at 194; see also Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at
1054. But see Walls v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 832 F. Supp. 1505, 1518-19 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
("[P]laintiff presented the jury with numerous documents generated between July 1982 and July 1983
reflecting [a concentrate manufacturer's] growing knowledge that hemophiliacs using concentrate were
being diagnosed with AIDS and that a blood borne, transmissible agent was spreading the disease via
concentrate products produced from pools of plasma drawn from thousands of unscreened donors.").
48. This suggestion does not open the scheme to attack as a proposal for ever-increasing federal
spending. It is unfortunate but obvious that the pool of claimants infected with HIV by factor concentrate
before 1984 will gradually diminish. Thus, the "general funds" portion of the compensation fund also
will gradually diminish. Ultimately, industry contribution will fund the entire scheme. Division of
responsiblity is not entirely untested. For example, Congress similarly designed the NCVIA to split
financing based on product usage date along such lines. Under the NCVIA, general congressional
appropriations fund compensation for injuries caused by pre-1988 vaccinations. An excise tax on vaccine
manufacturers funds compensation for injuries caused by post-1988 vaccinations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4131-
4132 (1988). See Cloney, supra note 25, at 595 n.23.
49. Most hemophiliacs use concentrates over the course of a lifetime, including (for those alive
at the time) dates before and after the "presumed negligent" date. Scheme administrators, therefore, must
determine when each claimant used the concentrate that caused his HIV infection. The problem is more
complicated in the blood products setting than it is in the vaccine setting because individuals use vaccines
during a very confined time period.
50. A medical specialist would likely need to certify these conclusions. Requiring individualized
determinations, however, could raise issues of scientific credibility and consistency-the very issues that
plague product liability litigation and the very issues that an administrative compensation scheme should
seek to avoid.
51. Allowing interested parties, such as manufacturers, to challenge individual findings would
not solve this problem. Rather, allowing such parties to dispute individual claims would simply import
litigation's inefficiencies into the administrative scheme.
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A superior method for ascertaining LDIs would begin with Congress
commissioning a study to create a table establishing uniform LDIs based on
the quantity of concentrate used by a claimant and the dates on which the
concentrate was used. For example, heavy product use during the years before
the "presumed negligent" date would likely lead to a LDI prior to April 1984.
Conversely, a small amount of product use before the presumed negligent date
and heavy use thereafter might lead to an opposite conclusion. With such a
table established, the scheme would require claimants to provide only
documentation of product use history.52 Scheme administrators would then
compare such documentation with the uniform table to determine LDI.
While the development of such a table might increase the scheme's
implementation costs, it invariably would save money in the long term,
particularly when compared to litigation in which LDI often becomes a highly
contested issue.53 Additionally, the establishment of a table would improve
the scheme's ability to maintain internal consistency. This, in turn, would
allow attorneys to give better advice to infected hemophiliacs. It also would
allow Congress to set appropriation and taxation levels with more
confidence.54 Controversy associated with LDI determinations will, of course,
diminish over time, as an increasing majority of claimants will have received
concentrate only after 1984.
D. Collection Methodology
After determining which claimants should receive compensation from
revenue generated by a blood products tax, a scheme must establish a method
for collecting such revenue. Kenneth Abraham has described two methods
through which compensation schemes can collect revenue from risk-creating
entities: (1) quantity-based charges and (2) quality-based assessments
"supplemented by experience-rating that would vary assessments in accordance
with the number of injuries clearly caused by an enterprise's activities.""
52. In helping determine the funding source of each claim, a LDI table would serve a purpose
similar to that of the NCVIA's Vaccine Injury Table. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a) (providing "a table
of vaccines, the injuries . . . resulting from the administration of such vaccines, and the time period
in which the first symptom . . . is to occur after vaccine administration for purposes of receiving
compensation under the Program").
53. LDI is a highly contested issue in factor concentrate litigation because it is important for a
plaintiff to prove that a manufacturer's negligence caused his infection. If a manufacturer can show that
a plaintiff was infected with IV from concentrate sold before the mid-1980s, then it can likely show
that the plaintiff's injury was not caused by its negligence. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying
text. If a plaintiff can show an LDI after the mid-1980s, however, the opposite is likely true.
54. A third option might require that an expert panel of scientists consider the product use history
of each individual claimant. This option, however, would increase costs and would not be likely to
improve the scheme's efficiency or consistency.
55. Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass




This Article suggests that Congress adopt a quantity-based approach, imposing
a tax on the sale of factor concentrate to fund the compensation of
hemophiliacs infected with HIV from blood products after April 1984.56
The primary benefit of a quantity-based assessment is its simplicity of
administration,57 no minor point given the LDI complexities already included
in this proposal. The use of a quantity-based assessment also avoids the
difficult issue of how to "experience-rate" a competitive pharmaceutical market
in which each industry member uses proprietary production techniques.58
A major criticism of quantity-based charges (and the primary reason that
some commentators support quality-based assessments) is that quantity-based
charges do little to deter negligent conduct or to increase the safety of risk-
producing activities.59 Some commentators doubt the validity of this
criticism.' °  Even these scholars, however, suggest that "[flairness
considerations serve as an alternative rationale for creating as close a linkage
56. This suggestion is modeled on the NCVIA, which is partially financed through an excise tax
on each dose of vaccine disbursed. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131, 9510 (1988). See supra note 48 (describing
NCVIA funding scheme). Proposals to compensate individuals injured through exposure to toxic
substances have also suggested quantity-based funding from risk-creating entities. See Jeffrey
Trauberman, Statutory Reform of 'Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on
the Chemical Vlcdm, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 177, 270, 272-77 (1983) (Proposed Chemical Injury
Liability Act §§ 208, 211, 212); Rabin, supra note 21, at 961 & n.58 (citing Superfund proposal for
taxing petroleum and chemical production and hazardous waste disposal). Cf. Price-Anderson Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2210(b),(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (financing nuclear power plant accident compensation
by requiring each nuclear licensee to purchase private liability insurance and contribute to a common
compensation fund in the event of a nuclear accident at any plant); Rabin, supra note 21, at 955
(discussing same).
57. See Abraham, supra note 55, at 890-91. Law and economics scholars argue that increased
administrative costs do not alone justify the avoidance of experience rating contributions to compensation
schemes. Rather, such scholars assert that a risk-benefit analysis should drive a scheme's funding
methodology. See Arlen, supra note 31, at 1099.
58. See Kellar v. Cutter Lab., No. 88-14059-CIV-RYSKAMP, slip op. at 9 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24,
1992); Doe v. Cutter Biological, 852 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D. Idaho 1994) (holding use of market share
liability inappropriate for blood products due to varying production processes). The blood products
market contrasts with that for childhood vaccines, where most manufacturers have monopolies on the
particular vaccine they manufacture. See Rabin, supra note 21, at 958.
59. See Arlen, supra note 31, at 1099 (advocating "experience rating" in schemes designed to
compensate victims of toxic hazards to make each injurer more directly bear the costs of the risks
created); see also Abraham, supra note 55, at 890 (arguing that quantity-based charges might have "no
effect on the level of safety at which the activities using these substances were conducted, because the
charges levied would not vary with these levels of safety").
60. See Rabin, supra note 21, at 977 ("From a deterrence standpoint, it is far from clear that
the choice between a flat-tax and a risk-sensitive schedule of charges makes any substantial difference. ");
cf. Abraham, supra note 55, at 891 ("[Tihe shift to funds financed by these enterprises would neither
sacrifice the incentive-creating capacity of the mass tort system nor increase it substantially."). In
addition, it is arguable that blood shield statutes demonstrate legislative determinations that efficiency
should not assume a primary role in imposing liability on blood processors. Indeed, if efficient deterrence
is understood as making an injurer's expected liability equal to the total expected cost of risk imposed
on others, see Arlen, supra note 31, at 1097, the blood shield statutes must serve some other purpose.
Therefore, arguments for elevating efficient deterrence to the level of a primary goal in other
compensation scheme contexts, see id. at 1104-05, might not be persuasive in the blood products realm.
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as possible between risk-producing activities and financial responsibility for
consequences. "61
Several factors diminish these concerns in the factor concentrate area.
First, the blood products industry has developed processing techniques that
have significantly reduced concentrates' viral risks.62 Therefore, the need for
safety improvements is not as pressing for blood products as it is for other
products, such as toxic chemicals. Second, this proposal's narrow scope (and
concurrent retention of the tort system) itself creates a deterrent against
negligent conduct. More precisely, if one blood processor fails to observe the
new industry standard, that failure likely would allow an HIV-infected
hemophiliac to connect his infection to that particular processor's product.
Proof of causation and negligence then would allow a plaintiff to obtain
compensatory (and perhaps punitive) damages in the tort system, a result that
any rational manufacturer would seek to avoid. Finally, removing difficult
causation cases from the tort system surely will promote fairness and efficiency
by reducing litigation costs associated with attempts to prove (or disprove)
causation. Removing difficult cases from the tort system also should reduce
discovery costs, expert witness fees in individual cases, and the lost value of
time between the filing of a lawsuit and the actual receipt of a damage award,
if one is forthcoming at all.63
In sum, money from both general appropriations and a quantity-based
excise tax should fund a blood products compensation scheme. The excise tax
funds should provide money to compensate individuals infected with HIV from
concentrate used before April 1984. General funds should compensate
individuals infected with HIV from concentrate used after that date. This
system will allow a compensation scheme to avoid conflict with blood shield
laws. At the same time, the system will provide a fair and efficient mechanism
through which many HIV-infected hemophiliacs can receive compensation for
their injuries.
61. Rabin, supra note 21, at 977.
62. See Stolberg, supra note 22, at A19.
63. See Gary T. Schwartz, The A.L.L Reporters' Study, 15 U. HAw. L. REv. 529, 537 (1993)
(estimating that for every dollar that comes into the tort system, only forty or fifty cents ends up
compensating injured victims); Sugarman, supra note 16, at 598-603 (discussing enormous transaction
costs involved in Agent Orange, Bendectin, ID, and asbestos litigation). Professor Schwartz states:
Now if tort law is regarded as a device for achieving either deterrence or fairness, that 50
percent overhead may not be all that troubling. Tort law may be succeeding in preventing
large numbers of terrible accidents; or, tort law might be keenly valuable as a way of
achieving fairness. But when tort law is considered from the perspective of efficiently
compensating accident victims, its very high overhead becomes quite hard to justify.





An administrative compensation scheme's ultimate success lies in the
method by which it compensates claimants. As Professor Abraham has written:
"In a very real sense the measure of compensation adopted by a fund would
be the key to its feasibility, because the cost of compensating victims through
a fund inevitably would be a prime issue in evaluating the proposals for
establishing it. ""
A blood products compensation scheme should fully compensate claimants
for medical expenses and lost income attributable to HIV infection. The
scheme also should award each HIV-infected claimant a fixed sum as
compensation for pain and suffering. Finally, the scheme should provide for
the recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses.65
As detailed below, providing recovery in this manner will help the scheme
serve several of its goals. First, the scheme will quickly compensate HIV-
infected hemophiliacs for actual damages associated with HIV infection.
Second, the scheme will promote efficiency in a way that does not discourage
the production of affordable blood products. Third, the scheme will encourage
claimants who can prove the traditional tort elements of duty, breach, and
causation to seek recovery through the tort system rather than through the
administrative process.
A. Medical Expenses and Lost Income
A blood products compensation scheme should fully compensate claimants
for medical expenses and lost income attributable to HIV infection.6" To
facilitate such compensation, the scheme should require claimants to provide
administrators with documentation of such loss when filing an initial
petition."'
The scheme should pattern its filing procedures on those of the NCVIA.
Under the NCVIA, a claimant files a petition with the United States Court of
Federal Claims."' The clerk of the court then forwards the petition to a chief
64. Abraham, supra note 55, at 894.
65. The proposal would not allow punitive damage awards. See infra note 89.
66. Such compensation should be provided to hemophiliac claimants or, if the claimant has died,
to family members in the form of a death benefit. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a) (1988) (NCVIA provision
on compensation).
67. Therefore, a claimant's initial petition will provide documentation of product use, see supra
notes 52-53 and accompanying text, and information regarding medical costs and lost income attributable
to HIV infection. While compiling such information will require effort, it is effort that would also be
expended in prosecuting a tort claim. Thus, requiring a claimant to provide such information does not
conflict with the scheme's goal of increasing the speed at which injured claimants can be compensated.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 l(a)(1) (1988). See Charles F. Hagan, Vaccine Compensation Schemes,
45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 477, 481 (1990).
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special master for assignment to a special master. The special master reviews
the claimant's documentation and returns to the court proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law.69 Under a similar blood products process, the clerk
also would assume responsibility for reviewing a claimant's product use
information and recommending a LDI based on the table described above.7"
After the special master forwarded her findings, the court of claims would
have the information necessary to make a compensation award and to establish
a LDI for the purpose of determining funding allocation.e whether the claimant
will be paid out of industry contributions or general funds.7' Within a
reasonable time,7" therefore, the court would issue a ruling stating a measure
of HIV-related damages and a LDI.73
As with the NCVIA, a blood products scheme should restrict a claimant's
ability to appeal these rulings. The scheme could allow a claimant to seek de
novo review of the special master's damages determination from the court of
claims. The scheme also could allow claimants to appeal the court of claims'
decision to a federal appeals court.74 Unlike the NCVIA, however, a blood
products scheme should provide claimants no opportunity to rebuke the
ultimate conclusion and file a tort claim."
In sum, a blood products compensation scheme should provide claimants
with full compensation for medical expenses and lost income attributable to
their HIV infection. Such an award would provide money to HIV-infected
hemophiliacs who desperately need funds to pay medical and living expenses.
Even with limited procedures for reviews and appeals, the process surely will
move more quickly than a lawsuit involving disputes over negligence and
causation.
B. Pain and Suffering
A more difficult compensation issue involves awards for nonpecuniary
damages, such as pain and suffering. The provision of some recovery for
nonpecuniary loss deserves serious consideration because such awards could
69. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12 (1988). Under the NCVIA, a petitioner may object to such findings,
and the court will conduct a de novo review of the special master's findings. Id. Petitioners can appeal
the court's ultimate determination to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id.
§ 300aa-12(f).
70. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
71. Ultimately, the special master or the court also will have to review a fee petition. See infra
Part Il.C.
72. The NCVIA requires the court of claims to render judgment within 365 days after the filing
of a petition. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12 (1988).
73. The LDI finding will determine the funding source for the claimant's compensation. See supra
Part II.B.
74. See supra note 70.
75. See infra notes 102-04, 113-17 and accompanying text.
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improve the scheme's ability to deter risk-causing activity by the blood
processing industry.76 This is especially important since the proposed scheme
already protects the industry from financial responsibility for a defined portion
of claims.'
Nonpecuniary damage awards, however, raise significant concerns. First,
the inclusion of nonpecuniary awards would increase the need for
individualized fact discovery, diminishing the scheme's ability to provide
compensation quickly. Further, the amorphous nature of such awards would
likely increase claimants' requests for reviews and appeals.78 As Professor
Abraham has noted in considering compensation alternatives to mass tort
litigation: "The availability of pain and suffering damages from a fund might
complicate (or bankrupt) it to the point of failure. ""
Professor Abraham, however, has identified several responses that could
limit such complications while ensuring that risk creators bear a greater share
of the costs associated with their acitivities.5 s One of Professor Abraham's
responses (the provision of fixed, scheduled death benefits keyed to normal
life expectancy) could be modified to work in the blood products realm." 1
Such a modification could provide for a fixed award (either a lump sum or a
76. Professor Arlen, for example, criticizes Professor Rabin's proposed toxics administrative
compensation scheme because Professor Rabin would exclude nonpecuniary loss from his system. Arlen,
supra note 31, at 1099-1100. Professor Arlen states that while "[sluch a limitation appears to promote
efficient risk-spreading by victims, [e]conomic analysis of insurance reveals that rational individuals do
not fully insure against all pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses associated with injury (or death). Thus,
full compensation recovery exceeds the recovery level that permits victims to spread risk efficiently."
Id. at I100-01. Professor Arlen, therefore, suggests that Professor Rabin could improve his proposal
by requiring each risk creator to pay an amount into a general fund that would include the risk of causing
nonpecuniary damages. Id. at 1102.
77. The proposal excludes the industry from contributing to the compensation of claimants infected
with HIV before April 1984. See supra Part II.B. Some might argue that this exclusion prevents efficient
deterrence. Without full cost internalization, it could be argued, an injurer's actual costs will never equal
the true costs of its activities. The injurer, therefore, might conduct its activities without an adequate
level of care. See Arlen, supra note 31, at 1097.
78. For similar reasons, Professor Abraham is skeptical of compensation schemes that allow
recovery for pain and suffering: "A fund almost certainly would have to deny compensation for such
intangible losses, because the limitation of recovery to more objectively provable out-of-pocket losses
would be necessary both to avoid disputes not easily resolved without fact-finding proceedings and to
limit the total cost of providing compensation." Abraham, supra note 55, at 894-95.
79. Id. at 895. The Superfund Report, for example, proposes a compensation scheme that would
not allow any recovery for pain and suffering damages. See Rabin, supra note 21, at 961 & n.63.
80. Abraham, supra note 55, at 895-96.
81. Id. See also Trauberman, supra note 57, at 277-78 (proposing section of Chemical Injury
Liability Act that would include an "annual hazard fee" to approximate risk-generating characteristics
of substances produced by entities contributing to funding); Rabin, supra note 21, at 961. Another of
Professor Abraham's proposed responses would be the creation of a new form of quasi-subrogation
action. '[T"his cause of action could be allowed against a particular enterprise only under circumstances
where an award of punitive damages would have been available had individual tort claims for
compensatory damages not been foreclosed by the adoption of the fund." Abraham, supra note 55, at
896. A similar action would not work well in this proposed scheme because claimants cannot prove actual
causation and, therefore, could not argue that punitive damages would deter the willful or reckless
conduct of any particular entity. See infra note 89.
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lifetime annuity) to approximate nonpecuniary damages for each claimant. The
provision of a fixed award would alleviate concerns that the scheme does not
force potential injurers to internalize the true costs of their activities. At the
same time, the scheme could administer such awards without a serious loss
of operational efficiency.
The use of a lump sum payment to compensate HIV-infected hemophiliacs
also has precedent: In Canada, the federal government has offered uniform
payments to HIV-infected hemophiliacs if recipients agree to forgo lawsuits
against the federal and provincial governments, hospitals, the Red Cross, factor
concentrate manufacturers, and insurance companies.8 2 As of March 1994,
reports indicate that the program will include a $22,000 up-front payment;
annual payments of $30,000 to infected persons for life; $20,000 a year to
surviving spouses for five years; and $4000 a year to each surviving dependent
child for five years."
Combining Professor Abraham's proposal with the Canadian system, a
blood products scheme could award each claimant a fixed payment as rough
compensation for pain and suffering." The amount of the lump sum payment
would be based on the amount of funding that Congress makes available for
the program. However, Congress should set the amount lower than an average
tort award to avoid making the scheme an attractive haven for those who can
prove causation in the tort system. 5
In short, this Article suggests a compromise solution to the problem of
compensating HIV-infected hemophiliacs for nonpecuniary damages: the
provision of a uniform payment to each claimant, either through a lump sum
82. See Clyde F. Farnsworth, Canadian Hemophiliacs Face AIDS, N.Y. TIMEs, May 1, 1994,
at 9; Rebecca Wigod, Tainted Blood Victims Advised Not to Consider Filing Lawsuits, VANCOUVER SUN,
Mar. 15, 1994, at B4.
83. Wigod, supra note 83, at B4. In Canada, the national government has public health
responsibility for regulating blood (which is considered a drug under Canadian law) and is subject to
liability for negligence in exercising its responsibility. The Canadian government faced a serious problem
when it learned that forty-seven percent of all Canadian hemophiliacs were infected with HIV prior to
1985. There are an estimated 1,000 Canadians who contracted AIDS through blood products. In addition,
blood transfusion recipients still face an estimated 1 in 50,000 chance of HIv infection, based on the
possibility of a plasma donor being infected with HIV but not yet having developed the HEIV antibody
that screening mechanisms detect. Farnsworth, supra note 83, at 9.
84. Unlike the Canadian system, this proposal suggests no continuing survivor payments. Rather,
lost income payments would help compensate spouses and dependents for actual losses.
85. In addition, providing uniform payments for blood products injuries makes more sense than
in other realms (such as toxic-related injuries). Although pain and suffering is certainly an individualized
concept, each claimant in a blood products scheme will have the same injury (HIV infection and
ultimately AIDS) instead of a wide variety of injuries (for example, toxic exposure could lead injuries
ranging from minor irritations to fatal cancer). Further, a lump sum payment would alleviate concerns
of severe undercompensation that might arise if payments were made on an annual basis until death.
Cf. Keith M. Garza, Administrative No-Fault Recovery For Transfusion-Related HIVInfection, 1993 DEF.
COuN. J. 384, 388-89. In this respect, claimants who happen to enter the system when they are suffering
from more developed effects of MV infection will receive the same compensation as those in the earlier
stages of the disease.
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or a lifetime annuity. This compromise serves all three of the goals identified
at the outset of this section. First, it helps the scheme provide claimants with
compensation quickly by reducing the need for individualized fact discovery.
Second, it promotes efficiency by forcing entities that contribute to the fund
to internalize a truer measure of their activities' risks.86 Third, it encourages
claimants who can prove the traditional tort elements of duty, breach, and
causation to seek compensation through the tort system rather than through the
administrative scheme.
8 7
C. Fees and Expenses
An additional goal of a blood products compensation scheme should be
to reduce the noncompensatory expenses that plague tort litigation. 8 The
provision of some fee and expense restrictions within a scheme would serve
this goal. A compensation scheme, however, must be cautious in limiting the
recovery of fees and expenses to avoid discouraging attorneys from
representing claimants in the process." To control costs and to encourage
representation, a blood products compensation scheme should adopt a fee
recovery provision similar to that set forth in the NCVIA. The scheme also
should adopt judicial interpretations of the NCVIA section regarding the
calculation of attorneys' fees.' °
The NCVIA provides that "[iun awarding compensation on a petition filed
under [this Act] the special master or court shall also award as part of such
compensation an amount to cover-(A) reasonable attorneys' fees, and (B)
other costs, incurred in any proceeding on such petition." 9 The court of
86. An economist, however, might still contend that the proposal falls short of accomplishing
this goal because it does not experience rate-taking into account the risk-creating behavior of each entity
that contributes to funding. See Arien, supra note 31, at 1099; see also supra note 61.
87. For reasons similar to those discussed in this section, the scheme should not permit the
imposition ofpunitive damages. Cf. 42 U. S.C. § 300aa- 15(d)(1) (1988) (prohibting punitive or exemplary
damages under NCVIA). Punitive damages are designed to punish wrongdoers and deter willful or
reckless conduct. See Keeton, supra note 9, § 2, at 9-12. These purposes would not be fulfilled where
a claimant failed to prove causation; if a claimant could not connect his harm to the conduct of any
particular entity, the imposition of punitive damages might unfairly punish a nonculpable actor.
Additionally, punishing entities that did not act in a willful or reckless fashion could deter beneficial,
rather than harmful, conduct. See supra note 31 (discussing the concept of overdeterrence).
88. See Schwartz, supra note 64, at 537 ("[TMort law delivers compensation in a way that entails
very high administrative costs. For every dollar that comes into the system, perhaps only 40 or 50 cents
winds up in the pockets of injured victims. The overhead, then, is 50 percent or more."); Sugarman,
supra note 16, at 598 ("It is tragic to spend such enormous sums in litigation in order to produce such
a relatively puny compensation fund.").
89. See DiFilippo v. Beck, 520 F. Supp. 1009, 1015 & n.7 (D. Del. 1981) (noting that a
"limitation of attorney's fees allowable may affect an attorney's willingness to accept an initial retainer");
see also Lawrence B. Lambert, Murder By Numbers: Calculating Reasonable Attorney Fees Pursuant
to Attorney Charging Liens, 45 FLA. L. REV. 135 (1993).
90. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) (1988).
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claims has ruled that administrators should calculate fees using a "lodestar"
method: the product of reasonable hours expended multiplied by a reasonable
hourly rate.92
Adoption of the NCVIA rule would allow scheme administrators and
judges to monitor fees and expenses, yet retain sufficient flexibility to adjust
amounts in unusual circumstances. Further, the adoption of judicial
interpretations of the NCVIA's provision would reduce extraneous litigation
surrounding fees and expenses.93 Finally, the adoption of the NCVIA rules
will help reduce overhead costs that plague tort litigation. Indeed, under the
NCVIA itself, fees and expenses constitute only a small percentage of total
award costs.94
IV. Tort Access
In many compensation schemes, a complicated issue arises when
proponents consider the extent to which claimants can retain access to the tort
system. Professor Rabin has explained: "The question is whether the tort
system can remain open as a 'fail-safe' alternative without diverting so many
cases from a well-functioning administrative scheme as to make the reform
effort meaningless. "" In some ways, this issue exposes an inherent problem
in broad scope proposals: Such schemes seem generally superior to tort law,
but no proponent can comfortably draw a line where the scheme fully
supersedes tort law.96 Because this Article's proposal has a narrow focus,
however, the problem of determining tort access is diminished: A blood
products scheme should replace the tort system only in situations in which the
92. See Doe v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 19 Cl. Ct. 439, 452-53 (1990). An
attorney petitioning for fees must maintain adequate records to support hours claimed for services
provided. The court must deem the claimed time, as well as the rate charged, reasonable under all facts
and circumstances. Monteverdi v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 19 Cl. Ct. 409, 414 (1990).
The NCVIA provides for reasonable fee recovery even where a good-faith claimant is unsuccessful in
a compensation petition. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) (1988); Cain v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, No. 91-817V, 1992 WL 379932, at *1 (Cl. Ct. Dec. 3, 1992).
93. See Garza, supra note 86, at 386 & n. 11 (noting that the provision of the NCVIA permitting
the recovery of attorneys' fees generated "substantial caselaw").
94. As of July 17, 1990, NCVIA petitioners had received $56.8 million through the compensation
fund, while fees and expenses amounted to only $1.6 million-approximately 3% of the total award
figure. Smith, supra note 25, at 227-28 & n. 139 (citing Andrew Blum, Plaintiffs Refile Suits on Vaccine,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 1, 1990, at 3). The figure is especially impressive compared to estimates that fees and
expenses in tort litigation amount to 40-50% of compensation. See supra note 64.
95. Rabin, supra note 21, at 976.
96. Although Professor Rabin ultimately counsels against retaining a supplementary tort system
in his proposal for a legislative alternative to mass toxic torts, he also states that a "principal aim of
retaining a residual tort remedy is to address the relatively small percentage of cases that involve very
serious injuries." Id. at 974. Professor Arlen criticizes the latter statement, arguing that individuals with
clear claims to recovery would be "the very victims who should be channeled into a compensation




tort system works poorly because a potential plaintiff cannot prove
causation.97 In other situations, the tort system should remain encouraged and
preferred.
A. Limitations and Complications
An explication of two scheme features illuminates the above-stated point.
First, the proposed blood products scheme will render "source" causation
irrelevant.98 A claimant will provide scheme administratoronly s with
evidence of "substance" and "exposure" causation-that is, proof that he used
factor concentrate99-but not with evidence of which entity manufactured the
concentrate that caused the infection. The scheme, therefore, will provide an
attractive option for infected individuals who would otherwise encounter
difficulty obtaining compensation in the tort system.
Second, a claimant who files a petition for administrative compensation
must permanently waive his right to bring a tort action against any blood
processor, insurer, or health care provider for damages related to his HIV
infection.t"e The permanent waiver requirement coalesces with this Article's
premise that "no cause" liability in blood litigation should be unavailable.' O'
Claimants who waive their right to sue are likely to be individuals with no
viable cause of action anyway."
97. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text; see also notes 9-14, 17-18 and accompanying
text.
98. In this context, proof of "source" causation refers to evidence that identifies the manufacturer
of the concentrate that caused the claimant's infection. See Abraham, supra note 55, at 860
(distinguishing "substance," "source," and "exposure" causation).
99. Under this proposed scheme, special masters should possess such evidence at each claim's
outset, as each claimant would be required to provide product use information to help determine LDI.
See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
100. The Canadian government requires a similar waiver in exchange for compensatory payments
to HIV-infected hemophiliacs. In contrast, the NCVIA allows claimants to reject a special master's
damage award and file a tort action. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-I l(a)(2) (1988). The NCVIA, however, creates
disincentives to do so, including rules that provide vaccine manufacturers with a tort defense based on
adequate warning to doctors (the learned intermediary defense), a defense based on compliance with the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and a rule prohibiting the award of punitive damages in tort. Id. § 300aa-
22. See Rabin, supra note 21, at 959. Two proposals to replace tort law for injuries caused by exposure
to toxic substances also would allow access to the tort system with certain built-in deterrents. For
example, the Superfund Proposal provides that if tort recovery is less than twenty-five percent more than
the scheme's no-fault award, the claimant/plaintiff must pay court costs and expert fees to the defendant
and compensate the fund for all payments previously disbursed. Id. at 961-62 & nn.64-66 (citing
Superfund Report at 181-83). The proposed Chemical Injury Liability Act would require reimbursement
to the fund before a claimant riles suit. Trauberman, supra note 57, at 286 (proposed section
218(c)(2)(A)).
101. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text. Ideally, a federally-enacted blood products
compensation scheme would expressly preempt any state law that permits the imposition of tort liability
without proof of actual causation. Such a rule, of course, would prohibit the use of market share liability
in blood products litigation.
102. Additionally, legislation should impose an ethical obligation on attorneys to inform potential
clients of the availability of the scheme as a means of compensation. Cy. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa- I 0(b) (1988)
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The features set forth above will make the compensation scheme an
attractive and secure option for potential claimants without the ability to prove
source causation. The scheme provides near-certain compensation, compared
to a questionable (and contested) opportunity for compensation through the tort
system. Thus, the compensation scheme will handle the tort claims that are the
most expensive and inefficient to litigate. 3 The tort system would retain
only a narrow category of blood products actions: cases where a plaintiff is
confident that he can prove actual causation." 4 As discussed throughout this
Article, allowing the tort system to resolve these claims promotes efficient
deterrence and fairness: the threat of litigation encourages manufacturers to
continue developing safer products. At the same time, eliminating the threat
of judicially-imposed group responsibility reduces the risk of overdeterrence
and free riding."05 Further, the retention of tort law in cases of certain source
causation appeals to notions of fairness and should make the proposal more
politically palatable.ee
The scheme as outlined above, however, neglects one potential group of
claimants: those hemophiliacs who can prove source causation, but who were
infected before the presumed negligent date of April 1984. These victims are
unlikely to succeed in a tort action because they cannot prove fault, yet the
proposed scheme fails to provide specifically for their compensation. The most
decent way to help this group of claimants is to allow them access to the
system although the scheme is designed for no cause cases. General
congressional appropriations should fund compensation for such claimants, as
their LDIs would be before the presumed negligent date.0 7 Despite political
difficulties in obtaining funding, it is hard to imagine any group of claimants
more worthy of support. These individuals have been infected with HIV
through no fault of their own. Further, the companies that made the product
("It shall be the ethical obligation of any attorney who is consulted by an individual with respect to a
vaccine-related injury or death to advise such individual that compensation may be available under the
program for such injury or death."); see Garza, supra note 85, at 386.
103. With similar reasoning, Victor Schwartz and Liberty Mahshigian proposed a "narrow focus"
alternative to DES litigation. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 16, at 966-67.
104. In other contexts, such a proposal would be unrealistic. For example, in many toxic tort
cases, connecting harm (for example, cancer) to any single substance is virtually impossible. In the blood
products setting, however, it is very possible that a product user or his medical facility would retain
records of product use and that such use will be limited to one brand of concentrate. Indeed, even in
the DES context, where the availability of records is sparse due to the long latency between product use
and injury, Schwartz and Mahshigian proposed a compensation scheme that would exclude cases where
proof of causation exists. Id. at 966.
105. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing overdeterrence).
106. See Rabin, supra note 21, at 977 ("Fairness considerations serve as an alternative rationale
for creating as close a linkage as possible between risk-producing activities and financial responsibility
for the consequences.").
107. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (responding to objection that this arrangement
intolerably increases federal spending). Congressional provision of funds for these cases avoids imposing





leading to their infection were also likely faultless. Finally, the amount of
money needed to compensate these claimants will diminish over time as more
claimants will have used concentrate only after 1984.0 s
B. Gatekeeping
In addressing access to the tort system, a compensation scheme must also
consider potential claimants who have filed tort claims before the scheme's
implementation. At one extreme, a scheme could allow access to every
individual who ever filed a claim for injuries relating to HIV infection through
the use of blood products. At the other extreme, a scheme could deny access
to any person who filed a tort claim before the scheme's enactment. Identifying
an acceptable middle ground, however, is not nearly as easy as defining the
extremes.
This Article suggests a middle-ground solution that uses the NCVIA as
a model." ° First, a blood products scheme should grant individuals with
claims pending at the time of enactment a defined period (before tort
adjudication) in which to dismiss their claims and enter the compensation
scheme. Second, the scheme should allow limited access to those with
previously adjudicated tort claims.
1. Claimants with Pending Tort Claims
For claimants with trial court actions pending at the time of enactment,
a blood products scheme should look to the NCVIA for a general framework.
The NCVIA provides:
A plaintiff who on the effective date of [the Act] has pending a civil
action for damages for a vaccine-related injury or death may, at any
time within 2 years after the effective date of [the Act] or before
judgment, whichever occurs first, petition to have such action
dismissed without prejudice or costs and file a petition [under the
Act] for such injury or death.'
108. See supra note 48. Additionally, there seems little risk that opening the door to such
claimants will flood the system with individuals who can prove source causation and who were infected
after the presumed negligent date. The financial incentives for such claimants to use the tort system
(access to higher pain and suffering awards, possible punitive damages, and attorneys' fees on a
contingent basis rather than the lodestar method) should suffice to keep such claims, for the most part,
out of the compensation scheme and in the tort system. See supra notes 85-86, 89-92 and accompanying
text; cf Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 16, at 967-68 ("The legislative system is 'standby
equipment' for the tort system, a vehicle to provide relief where the tort litigation system fails. The
damage amount should reflect that fact and be limited to the claimant's true excess economic losses.").
109. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-l1(a)(4)-(8) (1988).
110. Id. § 300aa-ll(a)(5)(A).
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Building on this framework, a blood products scheme must include several
additional features. First, a blood products scheme should clearly-and
permanently-preclude claimants who do not petition within the stated time
frame from filing a claim under the compensation scheme."' Second, the
scheme should explicitly require potential claimants to choose the scheme
before filing any pre-trial dispositive motion (for example, a summary
judgment motion on liability). Indeed, throughout its provisions, the scheme
should emphasize that it is impermissible for individuals to gamble in the tort
system and rely on the scheme as a backup. Similarly, a blood products
scheme should require claimants to dismiss pending actions with prejudice
before entering the administrative process. The Act should contain no hint that
a claimant can return to the tort system once he gains access to the
compensation scheme."'
2. Claimants with Adjudicated Tort Claims
Potential claimants with previously-adjudicated tort claims present a
different challenge. A simple solution is to draw a clean line at the date of
enactment. Prohibiting entry to individuals who used the tort system before
111. The scheme should similarly deny access to persons who file tort claims after the date of
enactment. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(6) (Supp. 1991) ("If a person brings a civil action after
November 15, 1988 for damages for a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the administration
of a vaccine before November 15, 1988, such person may not file a petition under subsection (b) of this
section for such injury or death."). Similarly, individuals who have lost in trial courts, but who have
appeals pending, should be permitted access to the scheme if they agree to dismiss their appeals. See
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-ll(a)(8) (Supp. 1991) ("If on [October 1, 1988,] there was pending an appeal or
rehearing with respect to a civil action brought against a vaccine administrator or manufacturer and if
the outcome of the last appellate review of such action or the last rehearing of such action is the denial
of damages for a vaccine-related injury or death, the person who brought such action may file a petition
under [this Act] for such injury or death.").
112. Cf. Amendola v. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 989 F.2d. 1180, 1187 (Fed.Cir.
1993). In Amendola, the Amendolas brought a medical malpractice action against a doctor in 1985,
predicated on injuries caused by childhood vaccinations. In 1989 (approximately one year after the
NCVIA's effective date), a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the doctor. The Amendolas then sought
to file a claim under the NCVIA. The court refused to permit the Amendolas to proceed with their
NCVIA claim, finding the claim untimely. The court held that "Congress' purpose is both clear and
clearly evidenced by the statutory framework. The statute provides a strong bias in favor of bypassing
the civil litigation route in favor of compensation claims under the Act." Id. at 1184. Amendola,
however, points out a lack of clarity in the NCVIA's "gatekeeping" provisions. In particular, the Act
can be read to permit the type of petition brought by the Amendolas; it provides: "If in a civil action
brought against a vaccine administrator or manufacturer before the effective date of this subpart damages
were denied for a vaccine-related injury or death ... the person who brought such action may file a
petition under [this Act] for such injury or death." 42 U.S.C. § 300aa- 1 (a)(4) (1988) (emphasis added).
Technically, the Amendolas were denied damages in a lawsuit "brought against a vaccine administrator
or manufacturer before the effective date of" the Act. To avoid this problem, a provision similar to §
300aa-I l(a)(4) in a blood products compensation scheme must make clear that waiting for a judgment
in a pending action waives access to the scheme. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 l(a)(7) (1988) ("If in a civil
action brought against a vaccine administrator or manufacturer for a vaccine-related injury or death
damages are awarded under a judgment of a court or a settlement of such action, the person who brought
such action may not file a petition under [this Act] for such injury or death.").
Blood Products Litigation
the scheme's effective date would improve the scheme's clarity in
administration and would reduce its operational costs. On the other hand,
denying compensation to innocently injured individuals due to the fortuity of
their infection date (or perhaps due to their promptness in filing suit) seems
highly unfair. Again, this Article suggests a middle-ground solution based on
a modification of a NCVIA provision.
Section 300aa-1l(a)(4) of the NCVIA provides:
If in a civil action brought against a vaccine administrator or
manufacturer before the effective date of [the Act] damages were
denied for a vaccine-related injury or death or if such civil action
was dismissed with prejudice, the person who brought such action
may file a petition under [the Act] for such injury or death. 3
A blood products scheme should contain two modifications to section 300aa-
1 l(a)(4). First, to avoid the ambiguity present in the NCVIA, a blood products
compensation scheme must clarify that its analogous section applies only to
claims brought and decided before the scheme's effective date. The scheme
must not allow potential claimants to wait out a case that is pending on the
scheme's effective date." Rather, claimants with pending tort claims must
determine a course of action consistent with the rules set forth above." 5
The provision, however, must account for the concern that providing
compensation to claimants with previously-adjudicated claims could greatly
increase the scheme's costs.1 6 This Article, therefore, suggests reducing or
eliminating the proposed lump sum pain and suffering payment to claimants
in this category." 7 By providing compensation for medical expenses and lost
income, the scheme would avoid completely denying recovery to some injured
individuals. At the same time, however, the scheme would control costs and
mitigate the unfairness of forcing industry members to bear costs twice for the
same claim: once in litigation, and then again to compensate the same claimant
through the scheme." 8
113. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(4) (1988).
114. See supra note 111.
115. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
116. Aside from the obvious expense of compensating these individuals, including this group of
claimants in the compensation scheme also would increase non-compensatory costs because the scheme's
administrative expenses would be in addition to (rather than in place of) litigation costs. The justification
for including these claimants, therefore, not on economics, but instead on a moral belief that society
should compensate such individuals.
117. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. Such claimants should receive full
compensation, however, for medical expenses and lost income. See supra Part Ell.A and accompanying
text.
118. Of course, reducing or eliminating the pain and suffering component of an award again raises
the argument that the scheme is not promoting efficiency. See supra notes 31, 77-78 and accompanying
text. The problem of reduced cost-internalization, however, is less compelling in dealing with claimants
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In sum, a blood products compensation scheme should provide generous
access to potential claimants who became infected with HIV through blood
products before the scheme's enactment. The scheme, however, should
vigilantly ensure that administrative access precludes further tort litigation, thus
allowing the scheme to increase cost efficiency rather than work in the opposite
direction.
Conclusion
This Article proposes a focused legislative plan to assist victims of a tragic
aspect of the AIDS crisis: hemophiliacs infected with HIV through the use of
pharmaceutical products processed from blood. The Article suggests a plan
with a narrow focus-an administrative compensation scheme designed to assist
hemophiliacs who have tenuous access to the tort system because they cannot
connect their infection to the conduct of any specific blood products
manufacturer. For such individuals, the proposed scheme would provide nearly
universal compensation for pecuniary damages related to HIV infection. For
hemophiliacs who can prove fault and causation, however, the tort system
would remain the preferred compensation route, with the possibility of both
pecuniary and nonpecuniary (including punitive) damages fully available.
In designing this scheme, this Article has considered tort law's traditional
goals-compensation, deterrence, and justice-without emphasizing any one
goal over the others." 9 In considering the compensation goal, this Article
set forth a mechanism by which many HIV-infected hemophiliacs could receive
who have already litigated their claims than with claimants who have not done so. In the former
situation, risk creators have likely incurred substantial costs. Even if such costs are not directly related
to a claimant's pain and suffering, the costs are quite real and must be internalized by the entities.
119. See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 16, at 559 (criticizing "devotees of economics who
emphasize the deterrence goal, moral philosophy fanciers who emphasize the justice goal, and enterprise
liability scholars who emphasize the compensation goal"); Robert L. Rabin, EnvzronmentalLiability and
the Ton System, 24 Hous. L. REv. 27, 43 (1987) (citing Gutmo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTs
(1970)) (identifying general goals of tort law as "accident prevention, victim compensation, and minimal
administrative expense"). This article has purposely avoided attempting to serve a punitive goal. See
id. (expressing skepticism at the concept of retribution as a goal of tort law). In this sense, the Article
agrees with Professors Abraham, Rabin, and Weiler, who find attempts to serve such a goal through
the development of compensation schemes little more than a fruitless morality play:
Even when the source of the immediate product disaster was deliberate profiteering, rather
than unfortunate (albeit negligent) human error, the executives actually guilty of such
misdeeds do not personally pay the awards. Moreover, the culpable executives have often
left the business long before the consequences of their misdeeds come to light. The reality
of all high-stakes litigation-even medical malpractice, in which the nominal defendant is
usually an individual doctor-is that some corporate enterprise or other entity will actually
pay the award with money that is then deducted from taxable income. The ultimate burden
of both jury awards and legal costs, then, is shifted to the shareholders, employees, and
customers of the company or the industry, even though none of these groups had any
personal culpability for the victim's injury.
Abraham, et al., supra note 24, at 339.
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compensation for medical expenses and lost income that might otherwise be
unavailable. On the other hand, this Article recognized that a workable scheme
might need to limit (or in some cases eliminate) nonpecuniary compensation,
including recovery for pain and suffering. In considering the deterrence goal,
this Article suggested a fixed component in some awards that would
approximate nonpecuniary damages-a component that law and economics
scholars find important to achieving efficient deterrence. On the other hand,
out of concerns for administrative fairness and to achieve more comprehensive
compensation, the proposal suggested a limitation on nonpecuniary damage
awards and counseled against experience rating each manufacturer's
contribution to the scheme. Finally, this Article attempted to present a proposal
that would be fair to a variety of interested parties-not only HIV-infected
hemophiliacs, but also non-infected hemophiliacs who need affordable blood
products, concentrate manufacturers in a competitive environment, and state
legislatures that have articulated clear policy statements concerning the
imposition of liability for injuries caused by blood and blood products. 20
Some might view the proposal contained in this Article as too narrow'
or outdated in its approach. 22 Even advocates of broad legislative directives,
however, admit that all legislation must be judged by certain norms, the heart
of which include a sense of fairness and purpose."2 This Article is motivated
by such a sense and, hopefully, has proposed the creation of a system in which
a hard case will actually make good law.
120. Although Congress could almost certainly supersede state-enacted blood shield laws, the
wisdom of doing so is dubious. Even if a federally-enacted strict liability rule in the area of blood
products did not directly affect the current blood products market, it would make industry skeptical of
future state attempts to encourage certain activity by limiting potential liability. Entities that engage in
such activity would rightly hesitate, feeling that if
injuries occurred, the federal government might obliterate the state law protection. Such a situation could
make it more difficult for the states to encourage important activities, like the development of an AIDS
vaccine. Indeed, the states are currently ahead of the federal government in this area, providing
companies with liability protection to encourage research. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-591b
(Supp. 1994); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.45 (West 1990).
121. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
122. See Edward L. Rubin, Law andLegislatdon in the Administraive State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
369 (1989). Professor Rubin articulates a theory of legislation in which he envisions legislatures issuing
goal-oriented directives to other branches of government rather than setting forth "rules that displace
or supplement the common law." Id. at 369. Thus, Professor Rubin encourages the initiation of all types
of policy through broad mandates-the "initiation of governmental power to achieve particular results,
ranging from securities regulation to public welfare to environmental protection." Id. at 372.
123. Professor Rubin identifies three norms that must guide the enactment of modem legislation:
(1) the legislature should exercise political control over administrative agencies; (2) legislation must be
fair and not oppress private persons; and (3) legislation should be effective and achieve the purpose for
which it was designed. Id. at 408-09. According to Rubin: "[liegislation is the mechanism by which.
. positive norms of fairness are implemented; if we cannot legislate effectively, we shall fail to produce
a regime that we regard as just." Id. at 409.

